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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case   
Shawn Nathan Fisher appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder.  Fisher asserts that, 
notwithstanding precedent holding otherwise, Idaho’s “abolition of the insanity 
defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (capitalization original).)  Fisher further contends the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a fixed life sentence.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 A grand jury indicted Fisher for first-degree murder, aggravated battery, 
aggravated assault, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, felony 
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor 
resisting or obstructing an officer.  (R., pp.39-41.)  These charges stemmed from 
a crime spree involving three separate victims, including Matthew Mohler-Kerns 
who died when Fisher shot him in the head, and Fisher’s subsequent capture by 
law enforcement.  (PSI, pp.3-5.)   
 Following competency proceedings and a seven month commitment to the 
Idaho Security Medical Program, Fisher was deemed fit to proceed, and the court 
ordered the proceedings to resume.  (R., pp.60-66, 74-75, 125-141, 175-176, 
182-185, 200-211, 220-221.)  After proceedings resumed, Fisher filed a “Motion 
to Declare I.C. §18-207 and Repeal of I.C. §[§]18-208, 209 Unconstitutional.”  
(R., pp.225-226.)  In his motion, Fisher argued “that the legislative abrogation of 
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mental condition as a defense, I.C. §§18-207, 18-208 and 18-209, violates [his] 
rights to equal protection; the effective assistance of counsel; to present a 
defense; to confront the evidence against him; to due process; and, to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment” as guaranteed by the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions.  (R., pp.225-226.)  The district court denied Fisher’s motion.  
(6/17/2015 Tr., p.27, L.22 – p.36, L.8.) 
 Fisher entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of second-
degree murder, reserving the right to challenge the district court’s denial of his 
constitutional challenges to I.C. § 18-207 and the repeal of I.C. §§ 18-208 and 
18-209, and the court’s ruling allowing access to Fisher by the state’s mental 
health experts.  (R., pp.264-273.)  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state 
dismissed “all other counts.”  (R., p.272.)  The court imposed a fixed life 
sentence.  (R., pp.282-284.)  Fisher filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.288-
289.)    






 Fisher states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court find that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity 
defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition 
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by executing a 
fixed-life sentence based upon its uncertainty as to whether 
Mr. Fisher will be medication compliant in the future? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (capitalization original).) 
 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
1. Has Fisher failed to articulate any basis for concluding that the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s opinions in State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 
(2011), State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), and State v. 
Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990), are manifestly wrong and must be 
overruled to remedy continued injustice? 
 
2. Has Fisher failed to establish a fixed life sentence for the murder of 
Matthew Mohler-Kerns is excessive, particularly given the district court’s 
consideration of the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2523, the objectives of 
sentencing, and the district court’s well-founded conclusions that a lesser 







I.   
Fisher Has Failed To Articulate Any Basis For Overruling Numerous Idaho 
Supreme Court Decisions Upholding The Constitutionality Of I.C. § 18-207 
 
A. Introduction 
Fisher “acknowledges Idaho Supreme Court precedent uniformly holds 
that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense does not violate any constitutional 
provisions.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10 (citing State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 
P.3d 709 (2011), State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), State v. 
Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990)).  Nevertheless, Fisher argues “that 
these cases have been wrongly decided.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Review of 
Fisher’s arguments and the controlling legal authority Fisher seeks to overturn 
shows that Fisher is reasserting arguments that have already been rejected and 
he has failed to present any argument or legal authority showing that the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s prior precedent was wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Constitutional questions are subject to free review, including challenges to 
the constitutionality of a statute.  State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 125, 267 P.3d 
709, 712 (2011) (citations omitted).  Legislative acts are presumed constitutional, 
“and any doubt concerning the interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor 





C. The Idaho Supreme Court’s Repeated Decisions Upholding The 
Constitutionality Of I.C. § 18-207 Are Not Wrong, Unwise, Or Unjust  
 
“In 1982, the Idaho Legislature repealed I.C. § 18-209 (‘[m]ental disease 
or defect excluding responsibility as an affirmative defense’) and enacted new 
language in I.C. § 18-207(a) to provide that ‘[m]ental condition shall not be a 
defense to criminal conduct.’”  Delling, 152 Idaho at 124, 267 P.3d at 711 
(citation omitted, brackets original).  Although I.C. § 18-207(1) provides that 
“[m]ental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct,” I.C. 
§ 18-207(3) permits the presentation of “expert evidence on the issue of any 
state of mind which is an element of the offense.”  In other words, I.C. § 18-207 
“removed the insanity defense as it existed previously and reduced the issue of 
mental condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary 
question.”  State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430, 825 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1991) 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985)).  
That evidentiary question “allow[s] consideration of evidence of mental illness 
directly on the element of mens rea defining the offense.”  Clark v. Arizona, 548 
U.S. 735, 752 (2006).  To that end, a defendant’s sanity, or lack thereof, may still 
be considered in determining guilt.  See Delling v. Idaho, 133 S.Ct. 504 (2012) 
(characterizing I.C. § 18-207 as a “modification of the insanity defense”).    
In 1990, in State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 634, 798 P.2d 914, 916 
(1990), the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that I.C. § 18-207 violates 
due process “because it prevent[s a defendant] from pleading insanity as a 
defense.”  Although “[n]either the federal nor state Constitutions contains any 
language setting forth any such right,” Searcy “argue[d] the insanity defense is so 
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deeply rooted in our legal traditions as to be considered fundamental and thus 
embedded in due process.”  Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this 
argument.  In doing so, the Court first recognized “[t]he insanity defense has had 
a long and varied history during its development in the common law,” but “[a]s 
the understanding of the mental processes changed over the centuries, the 
implications of a criminal defendant’s insanity have changed.”  Id. at 635, 798 
P.2d at 917.  As a result, there has been “a wide disparity in the positions taken 
on this issue both by legislatures and courts in the various states.”  Id.  The 
position taken by the Idaho Legislature is reflected in I.C. § 18-207 and does not 
violate due process.  In reaching this conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court relied 
on several United States Supreme Court decisions it believed “suggest[ed] rather 
convincingly” that the Supreme Court would agree.  Id.  at 636, 798 P.2d at 918.   
“First, in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the United States 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that due process required the use of any 
particular insanity test and upheld an Oregon statute which placed on the 
criminal defendant the burden of proving his insanity defense” by a reasonable 
doubt.  Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added) (parallel 
citation to Leland omitted).   
Second, the Court found significant the language in Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514, 535-536 (1968), recognizing that the “process of adjust[ing]” the “moral 
accountability of an individual” “has always been thought to be the province of 
the States.”  Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (quoting Powell, 392 
U.S. at 535-536).  The Court also cited Justice Marshall’s statement in Powell 
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that “nothing could be less fruitful than for th[e Supreme] Court to be impelled 
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.”  Searcy, 118 Idaho 
at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 536).   
Finally, the Court noted Justice Rehnquist’s comment in dissent in Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985), that “it is highly doubtful that due process 
requires a state to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant.”  
Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (brackets omitted, capitalization 
altered).  
Based on the foregoing authority, the Court concluded “it is difficult to 
understand how there could be an insanity defense guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution which, nevertheless, has no constitutional definition and is 
subject to differing definitions by various states, and may be subject to differing 
burdens of proof by the states.”  Id. at 637, 798 P.2d at 918. 
In 1991, one year after Searcy, the Idaho Supreme Court was again asked 
to consider the constitutionally of I.C. § 18-207, including the same argument 
raised in Searcy.  Specifically, in Card, 121 Idaho at 428, 825 P.2d at 1084, the 
defendant argued I.C. § 18-207 violates due process because “the insanity 
defense is so fundamental to our system of justice that its abolishment 
constitutes a denial of a fundamental constitutional right.”  Id.  In support of this 
argument, Card asserted the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302 (1989), “mandates the allowance of an insanity defense in death 
penalty cases.”  Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.2d at 1085.  This assertion was 
based on the following language in Penry: 
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The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” for their 
crimes suggests that it may indeed be “cruel and unusual” 
punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely 
retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their actions.  Because of the protections afforded 
by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be 
convicted or face the prospect of punishment.  
 
Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.3d at 1085 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 33). 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Card’s claim that the language in 
Penry compelled an insanity defense, noting that “the safeguard” in Penry exists 
in Idaho by virtue of I.C. § 18-210’s competency requirement, the mens rea 
requirements in I.C. §§ 18-114, 18-115, and 18-207, and the sentencing 
provisions of I.C. § 19-2523.  Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.2d at 1085.  The 
Court explained: 
 Idaho Code § 18-207 does not remove the element of 
criminal responsibility for the crime.  The prosecution is still 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had 
the mental capacity to form the necessary intent.  Idaho Code § 18-
207 merely disallows mental condition from providing a complete 
defense to the crime and may allow the conviction of persons who 
may be insane by some former insanity test or medical standard, 
but who nevertheless have the ability to form intent and to control 
their actions.  The statute expressly allows admission of expert 
evidence on the issues of mens reas or any state of mind which is 
an element of the crime.  See I.C. § 18-207(b).   In addition, the 
statutes require the sentencing judge to consider and receive 
evidence of the mental condition of the defendant at the time of 
sentencing.  I.C.  § 19-2523.  This statutory process provides the 
necessary safeguards and does not offend the principles of due 
process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 
(1990).      
 
Card, 121 Idaho at 430, 825 P.2d at 1086. 
 In 1992, the Idaho Supreme Court considered another due process 
challenge, as well as an Eighth Amendment challenge, to I.C. § 18-207.  In State 
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v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 854, 828 P.2d 879, 883 (1992) (citations omitted), the 
Court stated:  “It is well established that absence of an insanity defense in capital 
cases does not violate any constitutional protections.”  The Court reiterated this 
point in 1994, in State v. Moore, 126 Idaho 208, 210, 880 P.2d 238, 240 (1994), 
in response to another constitutional challenge to I.C. § 18-207, and declined the 
renewed invitation to “overrule its prior decisions on this issue.”       
 The most recent challenge to I.C. § 18-207 occurred in 2011 in Delling, 
152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709.  Delling argued that “the ability of a defendant to 
raise the issue of insanity with respect to criminal responsibility is required under 
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,” and that 
abolition of the traditional insanity defense that considered moral culpability was 
unconstitutional because that “defense predates both constitutions, having a long 
history back to the reign of Edward I in the 13th Century” and, “[a]s such,” “the 
defense is included in the respective due process clauses of both constitutions.”  
Delling, 152 Idaho at 125, 267 P.3d at 712.  Delling also argued “that the 
abolition of the insanity defense” violates the Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.  
Id.  Responding to the longstanding Idaho precedent holding that I.C. § 18-207 is 
constitutional, Delling argued that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Clark, 548 U.S. 735, rendered the Idaho Supreme Court’s previous reliance on 
Leland, Powell, and Ake unjustified.  Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.  
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed.   
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 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Clark “does not invalidate the reasoning 
in past Idaho opinions.”  Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.  This 
conclusion is supported by the express statement in Clark that the United States 
Supreme Court has “never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity 
defense, nor ha[s] [it] held that the Constitution does not so require,” and Clark 
itself did not “call upon [the Court] to decide the matter.”  Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 
n.20.  Thus, by its own terms, Clark did not decide whether an insanity defense is 
constitutionally required.  More importantly, as noted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, the Court in Clark reiterated the observation from Leland and Powell, “that 
no particular formulation [of the insanity defense] has evolved into a baseline for 
due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal 
offenses, is substantially open to state choice.”  548 U.S. at 752.  Since “due 
process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity,” and because 
legal definitions “devised to excuse [one] from conventional criminal 
responsibility, are subject to flux and disagreement,” the Idaho Legislature was 
free to do as it did – make the defendant’s mental condition a relevant evidentiary 
question for the jury to consider in determining the mental element of the charged 
offense instead of providing for a traditional insanity defense based upon an 
alleged lack of moral culpability.  See Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.     
Delling is the latest Idaho Supreme Court decision on this issue illustrating 
the principle that the Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions 
unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has 
proven over time to be unwise or unjust.”  State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 
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272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted); see also State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court 
should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise.”); Card, 121 Idaho at 440-52, 825 P.2d at 1096-1108 (McDevitt, 
J., specially concurring) (“While it may seem that stare decisis is a rule of 
convenience, it is not.  I believe that this rule requires us to stand by our prior 
decisions unless there are compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate a 
departure from our prior rulings.”).   
Notwithstanding the weight of authority affirming the constitutionality of 
I.C. § 18-207, including Delling, Fisher reasserts the same due process and 
Eighth Amendment challenges already rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
including arguments that a complete insanity defense based on moral culpability 
is constitutionally protected because it is “deeply rooted in American tradition.”  
(See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-16.)  Fisher also argues, as did Delling, 
that the Court’s reliance on Leland, Powell, and Ake was misplaced.  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.18-19.)  These arguments have been considered and rejected.  That 
Fisher, like Delling, disagrees with the Court’s interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent does not support his assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court’s 
numerous decisions upholding the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207 were wrongly 
decided, are “manifestly wrong,” or that overruling those cases “is necessary to 
remedy continued injustice.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10, 16-17.)   
In addition to arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court misread Leland, 
Powell, and Ake, Fisher also complains that “[i]n finding that the insanity defense 
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is not constitutionally required, the Delling Court found that Idaho law protects 
mentally ill individuals” by virtue of the requirements in I.C. §§ 18-210 
(competency), 18-207(3) (evidence of state of mind admissible), and 19-2523 
(consideration of mental illness in sentencing), but, he asserts, “[n]one of these 
provisions saves Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense from Due Process and 
Eight [sic] Amendment challenges.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.20 (citing Delling, 152 
Idaho at 128-131, 267 P.3d at 715-718).)  This is so, Fisher argues, because 
none of these statutes prevent those who are not “morally culpable” from being 
convicted.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.20-21.)  This argument fails as a due process 
complaint because it relies on the underlying premise that the Due Process 
Clause requires the traditional insanity defense based on an alleged lack of 
moral culpability; it does not.  See Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 (“no particular 
formulation [of the insanity defense] has evolved into a baseline for due process, 
and . . . the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is 
substantially open to state choice”).  Fisher’s argument also fails under the 
Eighth Amendment.           
“The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishments.”  Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.  The Idaho Supreme Court’s 
discussion of various Idaho statues in Delling was, in part, a response to 
Delling’s claim that abolition of the traditional insanity defense violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  Delling, 152 Idaho at 130, 267 P.3d at 717.  Delling’s argument 
was based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Penry, 492 U.S. 302, and Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  The Idaho Supreme Court correctly 
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concluded that neither Ford nor Penry support the conclusion that I.C. § 18-207 
violates the Eighth Amendment.   
In Ford, The Supreme Court held that execution of an insane prisoner 
violates the Eighth Amendment.  477 U.S. at 408-410.  Three years later, the 
Court in Penry considered whether execution of a mentally retarded prisoner also 
violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded it did not.1  Penry, 492 U.S. at 
335.  Neither Ford nor Penry stand for the proposition that someone cannot be 
convicted if he was “insane” at the time of his crime.  Nevertheless, Delling 
contended the following statement from Penry supported his assertion that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a traditional insanity defense:  “Because of the 
protections afforded by the insanity defense today, [a profoundly or severely 
retarded] person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.”  
Delling, 152 Idaho at 130, 267 P.3d at 717 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 333) 
(bracketed language altered).  This statement does not, however, translate to the 
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment, or any other constitutional provision, 
requires a state to provide a traditional insanity defense based on moral 
culpability, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s later statement in Clark 
that it has “never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense” at all.  
Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 n.20.   
Fisher’s complaints about the Idaho Supreme Court’s reliance on the state 
statutes that afford protections to mentally ill criminals ignores the fact that the 
                                            
1 Penry was abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the 
Supreme Court held that executions of mentally retarded murderers violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 
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only Eighth Amendment protection actually provided for in Ford is a prohibition 
on execution of the mentally ill, and Penry provided no Eighth Amendment 
protection at all for the mentally ill or the mentally retarded.  Neither applies to 
this case because Fisher was not sentenced to a penalty of death.   
At its core, Fisher’s Eighth Amendment claim is that he cannot be 
punished if he is not “morally culpable” because that was true at common law.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-22.)  That is not what Ford, Penry, or any other 
Supreme Court case holds, and Fisher’s Eighth Amendment claim has already 
been squarely rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.  Rather than citing any 
basis for concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court’s prior decisions were wrongly 
decided, Fisher repeats arguments that have already been rejected.  Such an 
approach falls far short of showing that the Idaho Supreme Court has been 
wrong for more than 25 years with respect to the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-
207. 
Because Fisher “has not provided any argument that shows the 
precedential cases to be wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust,” and has “failed to 
introduce legal authority that demonstrates the unconstitutionality of I.C. § 18-





Fisher Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 




 Fisher argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed life 
sentence, asserting the “district court imposed a fixed life sentence based 
entirely upon its inability to be certain that Mr. Fisher would be medication 
compliant, and therefore not a danger, in the future.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.22.)   A 
review of the record shows this assertion is incorrect, and application of well-
established sentencing standards to the facts presented to the district court 
reveals Fisher has failed to meet his heavy burden of establishing the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  Id.      
 
C. Fisher Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence 
 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court’s exercise 
of discretion are well-established.  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
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State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  To carry this burden 
the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of 
the facts.  Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted).  A 
sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary 
objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id. at 875-76, 253 P.3d at 312-13; State 
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001).  “When considering the 
sentence to be imposed, if the defendant’s mental condition is a significant issue, 
the sentencing judge must also weigh that mental condition as a sentencing 
consideration.”  Delling, 152 Idaho at 132, 267 P.3d at 719 (citations omitted). 
The defendant’s mental health does not, however, have to be the “controlling 
factor” in imposing sentence; it is only a consideration.  Id. at 132-133, 267 P.3d 
at 719-720.     
In imposing a fixed life sentence in this case, the district court recited the 
objectives of sentencing and the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2523 relating to 
Fisher’s mental illness.  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-18, p.113, L.19 – p.118, 
L.10.)  The court also considered the mitigating factors recited by Fisher, 
including his mental illness, his minimal criminal record, and the fact that Fisher 
“held a steady job for many years before quitting shortly” before murdering 
Matthew Mohler-Kerns.  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.118, L.11 – p.119, L.9.)  Considering 
the evidence and the applicable legal standards, the district court imposed a 
fixed life sentence, stating: 
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It’s clear and it’s clear beyond any doubt that a very 
substantial prison sentence is required, because to do otherwise 
would depreciate the seriousness of Mr. Fisher’s crimes. 
 
Were I inclined, based on the information available to me, to 
believe that there was a realistic prospect that Mr. Fisher could 
safely be returned . . . to the public at some future point without a 
meaningful risk, that he would engage in some kind of violent 
conduct like this again in the future, the sentence I would impose 
today would be different.   
 
But I just can’t get there comfort-level wise.  I think Mr. 
Fisher and the risk he present is a profound one.   
 
(9/30/2015 Tr., p.119, L.14 – p.120, L.3.) 
 On appeal, although Fisher quotes the nine pages of the transcript that 
reflect the district court’s thoughtful and thorough discussion of the relevant 
sentencing factors, he reduces the district court’s sentencing rationale to a single 
punch line, claiming the district court’s fixed life sentence was an abuse of 
discretion because it was “a hedge against its uncertainty” based on its concern 
that Fisher would not be “medication compliant in the future.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.23-26.)  Fisher is incorrect.   
 A sentence is not a hedge against uncertainty if it is based on a “high 
degree of certainty—certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration 
until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any 
time in his life, could be safely released.”  Windom, 150 Idaho at 878, 253 P.3d at 
315 (quotations and citations omitted).  The district court’s sentencing decision 
was not based on uncertainty, it was based on a determination, supported by the 
evidence, that there was no “realistic prospect” that Fisher could ever be safely 
returned to the public “without a meaningful risk that he would engage in some 
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kind of violent conduct,” and the risk Fisher presents to society is a “profound 
one.” (9/30/2015 Tr., p.119, L.18 – p. 120, L.3.)  To be sure, Fisher’s risk is 
based on his behavior “in an unmedicated state” as it relates to his mental 
illness, but it is also based on his history of drug use.  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.112, 
Ls.22-25; see also p.113, Ls.9-12.)  Importantly, however, the district court’s 
concerns about Fisher’s dangerous behavior in an unmedicated state were not 
based on uncertainty about Fisher’s ability to comply with medication 
requirements, they were based on evidence that Fisher is not voluntarily 
medication compliant, i.e., certainty that Fisher will not be medication compliant if 
released from prison and certainty that Fisher would present an unreasonable 
risk of danger in that situation.  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.79, Ls.1-10 (testimony that 
Fisher had to be forcibly medicated), p.85, L.18 – p.88, L.4 (testimony regarding 
risk Fisher presents, and reduced risk predicated on treatment and medication).)  
Along these lines, the district court noted, more than once, that Fisher had been 
“forcibly medicated” and “has a history of declining medication.”  (9/30/2015 Tr., 
p.114, Ls.18-23, p.115, Ls.7-25, p.118, Ls.8-10.)  The court also specifically 
found:  “Mr. Fisher, if left to his own devices, is I think rightly perceived as a risk 
to not be compliant with medication regimens and to slip back into the kind of 
condition he was in when he did the terrible thing he did.”  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.115, 
Ls.15-19.)  Importantly, without treatment, Fisher “would be like he was when he 
was arrested”; Fisher must get treatment to keep his “symptoms at bay.”  
(9/30/2015 Tr., p.82, Ls.9-13.)  Moreover, as noted by the district court, even with 
medication, the symptoms of Fisher’s mental illness that resulted in the murder of 
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Matthew Mohler-Kerns are not eliminated.  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.114, Ls.3-14.)  Even 
medicated, Fisher continues to experience some delusions and is still unable to 
“spend a lot of time out in the common areas due to getting overstimulated and 
uncomfortable around other people.”  (See 9/30/2015 Tr., p.88, L.24 – p.89, L.22 
(discussion of some delusions Fisher continued to have even while medicated, 
although other delusions ceased), p.91, Ls.10-22 (testimony regarding limited 
socialization and “reduced” delusions and paranoia).)   
Fisher’s use of illegal substances, like the bath salts found in his system at 
the time of his arrest, only exacerbates the risk he presents.  (9/30/2015 Tr., 
p.70, Ls.11-16, p.86, Ls.5-12; PSI, p.11.)  As explained by Fisher’s expert, 
substance abuse by a schizophrenic, like Fisher, is “like putting lighter fluid on a 
fire.”  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.8-12; see also p.90, Ls.15-22.)  It “enhances the 
paranoia, the delusions, the heightened state of needing to protect yourself if 
you’re paranoid.”  (9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.12-14.)  Fisher’s substance abuse 
“contributed significantly” to his behavior on “the night of the incident.”  
(9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.8-16; see also p.91, L.23 – p.93, L.2.)        
 Fisher argues that the “district court’s concern that [he] would not be 
medication compliant in the future, based upon the fact that he was not 
medication compliant in the past, is misguided,” because, he argues, “[t]here is 
nothing in the record to suggest that after at least seven and one-half additional 
years of understanding that he is schizophrenic and taking medications to help 
him control his delusions, [he] would not be medication compliant.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.27.)  It is Fisher’s argument that is misguided.  Unlike the district court’s 
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concerns, which were based on evidence, Fisher’s argument is based solely on 
speculation.   
That Fisher also believes his expression of remorse at sentencing, made 
while medicated, demonstrates he would not “pose a threat to public safety in the 
future” if he chose to remain medicated does not mean the district court’s finding 
that his history of non-compliance and forced medication was a “hedge against 
uncertainty.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.26-27.)   
 Fisher’s arguments also ignore the following admonition from Windom: 
The task of sentencing is a difficult one.  When evaluating 
the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, trial judges are asked 
to make a probabilistic determination of a human being’s likely 
future behavior.  The reality is that a sentencing judge will never 
possess sufficient information about the defendant’s character, life 
circumstances and past behavior so as to project future behavior 
with unerring accuracy.  To the contrary, the factual determination 
of the defendant’s probability of re-offense will always be based on 
limited data.  This extraordinarily difficult task is made more difficult 
because it is merely one factor to be considered by the sentencing 
judge – and a subordinate consideration at that.  State v. Moore, 78 
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956) (“Rehabilitation is not 
the controlling consideration….  The primary consideration is, and 
presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of 
society.”). 
 
Sentencing is less a science than an art.  Judges face a 
different uncertainty principle than physicists:  they must make a 
factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based 
upon limited data.  In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated 
experience.  It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an 
objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a 
deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions. 
 
Windom, 150 Idaho at 879, 253 P.3d at 316.    
As in Windom, the district court in this case expressed valid concerns 
regarding a history of being non-compliant with mental health medication and the 
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danger such non-compliance presents to the public, as evidenced by the conduct 
for which the defendant was being sentenced.  Compare Windom, 150 Idaho at 
877, 253 P.3d at 314.  The Idaho Supreme Court did not second-guess the 
district court’s imposition of a fixed life sentence in Windom, and there is no 
reason to second-guess the district court’s decision in this case.  Windom, 150 
Idaho at 879-880, 253 P.3d at 316-317.   
Applying the correct, and deferential legal standard set forth in Windom, 
Fisher has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 
fixed life sentence.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Fisher’s guilty plea to second-degree murder. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2016. 
 
     
 __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________ 
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